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PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC AND
PRESIDENTIAL POWER:
THE REAGAN INITIATIVES
Theodore Otto Windt, Jr.
what in the world can one say at this early date about the rhetoric of
President Ronald Reagan? That question has plagued me for the past month
as 1 have sought to prepare this address. His Inaugural Address originally
struck me as stylistically plain and substantively repetitive. Just a re-hash of
his campaign speeches. In fact, in an interview with United Press Interna
tional in late January, I assigned Reagan a C+ for his opening rhetorical
effort.
Yet, at a Conference on "Independence and Interdependence" in Wash
ington a month ago, a conference sponsored by the Center for the Study
of the Presidency, I heard scholars and journalists alike speak about the
effectiveness (and in one case, the "genius") of President Reagan as a com
municator. Judy Woodruff of NBC and Anne Compton of ABC spoke glow
ingly of how the Reagans have already dazzled Washington in a way that
reminds the old timers of the halcyon days of Kennedy and Camelot. Very
heady stuff!
Such comments disturbed me. Thus, I returned to the texts and video
tapes of Reagan's Inaugural, his speech to the nation on February 5, and his
address before the joint session of Congress on February 18. In revisiting
them, I still discovered none of the stylistic soaring that occasionally set
President Kennedy in flight; little of the social concern for the down-trod
den that made Lyndon Johnson memorable; and none of the logical or
psychological complexities of a Richard Nixon.
On the other hand, Reagan's speeches are refreshingly attractive after the
dull, dog days of Ford and Carter.
What is one to make of all this, I wondered? And then several clippings
caught my eye. In a column entitled "A Sweet Fellow ..." James Reston
observed that Reagan "seems to be an improviser with a half-conscious
awareness of where he wants to go and a firm conviction that the people,
if not the Congress, will go with him."' A senior foreign policy adviser is
quoted as saying: "The public has the capability of understanding on a net
basis, in monosyllables, simply communicated by a man such as this Presi
dent, the state of the world in regard to this nation."' On the other side,
Senate Minority Leader Robert Byrd warned against the now abandoned
television advertising blitz planned to build public support for Reagan's
Theodore Otto Windt, Jr. is Associate Professor of Rhetoric at the Uni
versity of Pittsburgh. This text is a transcript of a speech delivered at the
72nd Annual Convention of the Eastern Communication Association, Pitts
burgh, April 23, 1981.
' New York Times, Mar. 1981, p. 19 E.
' Ibid, p. 4 E.
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40 SPEAKER AND GAVEL
programs but still called it "a perversion of the political process," "a sinister
approach."' More recently, at the National NAACP meeting in Pittsburgh,
Benjamin Hooks described Reagan's politics as "Alice in Wonderland," a
"taking from the poor to give to the rich."^ Supporters of Reagan hail him
as the man who will restore America to greatness. Detractors score him for
practicing the politics of nostalgia, for longing for a day that never was and
never will be.
What is one to make out of this confusing din of discordant clanging?
What is one to make of Reagan's rhetoric? This morning I want to try to
answer three questions. First, how well has President Reagan thus far used
the rhetorical advantages available to him? Second, what meaning can we
assign at this early date to the fundamental substantive and strategic rhe
torical efforts he has used to get his Economic Renewal package passed?
And finally ethos; Is President Reagan an authentic political voice of the
present or nothing more than a voice from the nostalgic past? In posing
these three questions rather than a host of others, I am taking primarily an
analytic position of trying to figure out how well or ill President Reagan has
used an essential part of his power as President, this rhetorical power to
persuade many Americans to support his economic policies. And I want to
pose at least tentative answers to the questions about what all this means
and whether Reagan is authentic.
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s The Imperial Presidency truly mesmerized jour
nalists and scholars alike. It summarized the public mood of frustration,
anger, and betrayal that had begun with Vietnam and culminated in Water
gate. Schlesinger echoed what Edward Corwin had warned against in his
magisterial The President: Office and Powers, to wit, that concentrated per
sonalized power in the Presidency is dangerous.' As all of us recall, charges
of abuse of power became commonplace. Calls for reining in the President
came from all quarters.
But with all this concern, an essential fact was overlooked. A President
may commit illegal or improper acts precisely because he does not have
the constitutional or statutory authority to act in areas where he deems
action imperative. In making this statement, I am not excusing any past
President for acting illegally. What I am saying is that Presidents do not have
as much power to act as we sometimes believe, at least they do not have
the constitutional authority invested in them the public believes they may
have.
And in domestic economic affairs a President has hardly any legal power
to act. To many weened on the gospel of the President as the most powerful
man in the world, such a statement may seem heretical. But it is true none
theless. Franklin Roosevelt knew it. In his First Inaugural Address, Roosevelt
declared that he would "ask the Congress for the one remaining instrument
' Pittsburgh Press, 8 Mar. 1981, p. A-11.
* Pittsburgh Posf-Cazeffe, 14 April 1981, p. 1.
' Cf. Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, (New York: New York
Univ. Press, 1957), pp. 311-13.
* "First Inaugural Address," The Roosevelt Reader, ed. Basil Rauch (New York: Holt.
Rinehart and Winston, 1957), p. 94. Emphasis added.
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to meet the crisis [of the depression)—broad Executive power to wage a
war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given me
if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe."' Bruce Lederwitz, a Professor
of Law at Duquesne University, recently pointed out the passive nature of
Presidential executive power and the limits on the President's ability to act.'
In a slim volume appropriately entitled, Congress Against (he President, Rich
ard M. Pious described the President as "initiator-in-chief," rather than
actor-in-chief. He pointed out what most of us know: real legal power In
economic matters resides with Congress. The President can only request or
initiate.®
Faced then with demanding domestic problems, how is a President to
act? What I want to concentrate on is not the President 8s requester but
the President as initiator-in-chief.
The first months of a new administration provide a unique opportunity.
The first six to nine months offer a new President the opportunity, if he
seizes it, to impress his agenda, his perspectives, his language upon the
American people in such a way as to galvanize public support for his pro
grams. Apparently, Reagan and his aides realized this. One of his aides in
cisively described these early months as the "rhetoric stage" of the admin
istration.' Once this unique period passes, his speeches may become
repetitive, and thus lose vitality and eventually the public's attention. But
at the beginning, a new President has this opportunity to mobilize opinion
as a weapon to persuade Congress to pass his legislative bills or to grant him
authority to act through Executive orders. How well has Reagan used this
opportunity? We may answer that question by looking at what he has done
and by comparing his rhetorical actions with those of recent Presidents.
In Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion, E. E. Cornwell observed:
The President's prime weapon for influencing policy-making is his ability to
command and influence a national audience .... Since little is likely to be
done constitutionally to strengthen the President's hand, his ability to lead
and mold public opinion, for all its inherent limitations, remains his prime
reliance. More than ever before, the limes demand strong Presidents and
more than ever before, the strong presidents will be the skillfull leaders of
public opinion."
I believe President Reagan has been exceptionally effective in these opening
months, effective enough for me to revise my grade from a C-i- to an A-.
He set his priorities firmly. He would stress domestic affairs, not foreign
affairs. He would concentrate on economic issues that affect all Americans,
rather than controversial social issues so favored by one-issue interest groups.
These choices—limited and concentrated—give precise coherence to the
beginning of his Presidency and direction not only to his subordinates but
'Bruce Ledewitz, "The Uncertain Power of the President to Execute the Laws,"
Tennessee law Review, 46 (Summer, 1979), 757-806.
•Richard M. Pious, "Source of Domestic Policy Initiatives," Congress Against (he
President, ed., Harvey C. Mansfield, Sr., Vol. 32, No. 1 of Proceedings of (he Academy
of Political Science (Montpeiier: Capital City Press, 1975), pp. 98-111.
' New York Times, 8 Mar. 1981, p. 4 E.
"E. E. Cornwell, Presidential leadership of Public Opinion, (Bloomington: Indiana
Univ. Press, 1965), p. 303.
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to the public as well. Furthermore, he has acted swiftly, putting together a
rhetorical package of three major speeches, each intended to function as
part of a coherent campaign to make his economic programs easily under
stood by the public. By advancing quickly. President Reagan caught Con
gress still in its organizing state of disorganization.
Reagan's Inaugural Address restated basic themes of his campaign in the
more or less general terms appropriate to an Inaugural. On that same day,
he acted symbolically by issuing an Executive Order freezing government
hiring. Probably, Reagan did not have the legal power to order the freeze,
and it is now being contested in the courts. But the symbolism is more
important. The hiring freeze is an existential symbolic act that demonstrates
the authenticity*of the speaker to his audience, an act that tells them he
literally means what he says.
In his second nationally televised speech of February 5, Reagan sought to
impress his audience with the gravity of our economic situation. He called
it "the worst economic mess since the Great Depression." And he stressed
the four general policies—tax cuts, budget cuts, regulation reform, and a
consistent monetary policy—that would have to be enacted to solve our
economic difficulties. Of course, this speech was intended to prepare the
American people for the details that would be forthcoming in his next
speech, to dispose them favorably by impressing upon them the imperative
to act swiftly. The speech was intended to create a linguistic perceptual lens
for the people (and thus Congress) to see the gravity of the problem, its
specific causes, and its general solutions.
This speech is critical. If a President is going to make major changes in
the direction of government and propose entirely new policies to deal with
problems, he must first change the language by which one thinks about
those problems and policies. Thought does not exist without language. Thus,
the kind of language one has conditions the ways in which one can think.
If a President proposes policies (i.e., the Economic Renewal Programs) that
are radically different from past policies, he must also discredit the prevail
ing political language (i.e.. New Deal federalism) and replace it with one
congenial to his policies. That two-fold purpose is too much for a single
speech. A President must discredit the language first and then in a separate
speech present details of his proposals.
Therefore, before a joint session of Congress on February 18, President
Reagan articulated specific policies in each of the four areas that comprise
his "economic renewal" for America. Two major themes run throughout
these speeches: (1) the persistent fear that if his programs are not enacted
soon, our situation may grow hopeless; (2) the persistent confidence that if
these programs are enacted, our present distress will be alleviated. These
observations may seem commonplace. But after eighteen months of drift
and disarray under President Carter, the decisive rhetoric of Reagan may
convince many that once again they can master their own fates. The image
of confidence may spawn a real confidence in people, a confidence essential
if Reagan's programs are to have a hearty chance for passage in Congress.
Moreover, representatives of the administration ushered forth carrying
Reagan's message through the media and before Congressional committees.
The week-end following the speech before Congress, administration offi-
8
Speaker & Gavel, Vol. 19, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 1
https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol19/iss3/1
SPEAKER AND GAVEL 43
cials appeared on each of the nationally televised news conferences: "Meet
the Press," "Face the Nation," and "Issues and Answers." And they repeated
the President's message almost verbatim.
All in all, I believe President Reagan seized the rhetorical opportunities
available to him in a masterful manner. Probably, his most effective argu
ment, however, came in the February 18 speech. He challenged any poten
tial opponents to come up with a better program:
Have they an alternative which offers a greater chance of balancing the
budget, reducing and eliminating inflation, stimulating the creation of jobs
and reducing the tax burden? And if they haven't, are they suggesting we
can continue on the present course without coming to a day of reckoning?
Opponents did not have an immediate, coherent set of programs to an
swer him. Thus, the challenge he laid down to come up with an alternative
was answered either by silence or by picking at parts of his proposals. Rea
gan's initial rhetoric and that of his surrogates was decisive, repetitive, and
glowingly optimisf/c. Congress quickly found itself on the defensive, and
prior to the assassination attempt, Reagan's Presidency had that mysterious,
elusive ingredient necessary for passage of domestic bills—"momentum."
But how do Reagan's efforts compare with those of other recent Presi
dents? Neither Kennedy nor Nixon nor Ford nor Carter used this "rhetoric
stage" of a new administration as effectively. It is not enough that a President
grab hold of the opportunities confronting him. He must also avoid major
mistakes that weaken him politically and thus rhetorically.
From a rhetorical standpoint, Kennedy was not very competent. Within
three months of his inauguration he destroyed his "honeymoon" with Con
gress by approving the disastrous Bay of Pigs. Additionally, he played most
of his "power chips" in getting the House Rules Committee enlarged. For
the next two years Kennedy usually found himself on the defensive, de
fending policies-in-place rather than advancing the programs he had so
vigorously advocated during the 1960 campaign. Furthermore, after his stir
ring Inaugural Address, he abandoned oratory for the televised press con
ference. Certainly press conferences are a worthwhile means for exploring
disconnecting policies and even clearing up occasional misunderstandings,
but they are not an effective substitute for speeches in marshalling public
support for programs." Not until after the mid-term elections of 1962 did
President Kennedy begin to creep forward with the most important items
on his domestic agenda. By that late date, the list of items had been severely
cut back.
More concerned with foreign policy and building a workable constituen
cy, President Nixon waited until june, 1969 to begin a serious rhetorical
offensive. Most of these efforts were spent expanding his constituency
{through the Southern Strategy and later by concentrating on the so-called
"Social Issues"), instead of pressing for domestic legislation. Indeed, with
the notable exception of environmental legislation, President Nixon hardly
had any of his priority domestic programs passed (e.g., welfare reform, etc.).
President Ford, that accidental President, never had a chance. He was
" On Kennedy, see my brief description of his problems in "John Fitzgerald Ken
nedy," Presidential Rhetoric: 1961-1980 (Dubuque: Kendall-Hunt, 1980), pp. 7-9.
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rhetorically inept. William Safire said of him somewhere that Ford was the
only President in the 20th century not to utter one memorable phrase
during his administration. The pardon of Nixon—only one month after the
resignation—destroyed the era of good feeling Ford's ascension to the Pres
idency created.
President Carter had opportunities similar to Reagan's, but he squandered
them. He waited three months before presenting his comprehensive energy
program. By then, Congress was organized and waiting. Carter attempted
the same kind of rhetorical blitz as Reagan: first, a fireside chat to the people
on the need for an energy program; second, an address before a joint ses
sion of Congress on the details; finally, a press conference intended to
clarify any points not covered by the speeches. But all these efforts were
squeezed into a single week! Carter's rhetorical attempts were rather like a
skyrocket that burst beautifully against a dark night, then fizzled and finally
fell to ground unnoticed and forgotten.^- It took President Carter practically
three years to get major portions of his energy package passed.
Only Lyndon Johnson realized the advantages of the "rhetoric stage" and
exploited them fully. Five days after the assassination of President Kennedy,
Johnson used the collective grief of the American people to urge passage
of Kennedy's tax cut bill and the public accommodations civil rights bill.
Within a year, both passed. Then, on January 8, 1964 Johnson declared war
on poverty and solicited from Congress a variety of programatic weapons
with which to wage that war. Johnson so seized the advantages of the "rhet
oric stage" that both his opponents and Congress found themselves on the
defensive for the next two years. And during that time Johnson compiled
a domestic record only a few Presidents in American history can match.
President Reagan has made an equally auspicious start. He has done about
all he can do rhetorically to gain passage of his programs. Whether the
assassination attempt will roll back the "momentum" originally gained re
mains at this date to be seen.
2.
Now, to the second question: what meaning can we assign to the fun
damental substantive and strategic efforts Reagan has initiated? Since this
paper is principally an over-view of Reagan's rhetoric, I shall leave it to my
colleagues and others for detailed and intensive analysis. The substantive
issues turn on two points: (1) the package itself of tax cuts, budget cuts,
monetary stability, and regulation reform; and (2) Reagan's conception of
the responsibilities of the federal government, interestingly, the emphasis
in Reagan's speeches has been on policies and programs rather than con
servative principles. That seems to fly in the face of the conventional wis
dom that Americans are more conservative in principle but more liberal
about specific policies, especially those governmental programs that directly
benefit them. The obvious answer is that President Reagan had to present
specific proposals to Congress. But two other things seem also to be at work.
" For some of the other problems President Carter had as a speaker, see Presidential
Id^etoric, pp. vii-viii, 235-37.
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First, by presenting the Congress and the people with his economic pack
age, he is projecting the image of a decisive President acting immediately
on his domestic agenda. And the image of acting may be more important
initially than the action itself, especially to an electorate suffering distress.
Second, President Reagan has persistently argued that all of us (with the
notable exceptions of the "truly needy" and the military establishment)
must sacrifice now, so that all may benefit in the future. Such a strategy may
cause grumbles from some whose programs are being cut, but it forestalls
for the time being a major revolt against his budget cuts. That length of
time may just be sufficient to get the bills passed.
On the other hand, Reagan's political philosophy has not been taken as
seriously as it deserves. Part of this is due to the emphasis on programs
instead of conservative principles. Part is due to the belief among some that
Reagan is a media creation, not a substantive man. And part is due to the
simplicity with which Reagan presents his ideas. But I believe that he is
substantive and even revolutionary.
In his speech before Congress on February 18, Reagan stated:
The taxing power of government must be used to provide revenues for
legitimate government purposes. It must not be used to regulate the econ
omy or bring about social change. We've tried that, and surely we must be
able to see it doesn't work.
Spending by government must be limited to those functions which are
the proper province of government.
These statements succinctly summarize Reagan's political thinking. Federal
money should not be used to regulate the economy; federal money should
not be used to bring about social change. The first suggests a laissez faire
economic system, and few Reaganites deny that interpretation, instead, they
champion the virtues of "supply-side" economics. The second is more am
biguous. Denying the use of federal money for social change implicitly means
bringing forth another kind of social change. For skeptics of Reagan, it
means a retreat from social justice, human rights at home, and equal op
portunity for minorities. For rabid Reaganites, it means a return to basic
American values which translates into eventually returning prayers to the
public schools, an anti-abortion amendment, and an end to school busing.
But there is another layer of meaning beneath this level. If Reagan limits
government involvement in economic and social matters and if he is able
to return federal revenue sources to the states, he may be changing the
uniformity with which the federal government has administered and en
forced some laws for the past fifty years. Such a change in federal respon
sibilities will surely dwarf the changes wrought by the New Deal.
Reagan's revolutionary vision of federal responsibilities seems to be ac
companied by a political revolution in the making. A careful reading of his
speeches reveals appeals not to clearly defined constituencies but rather to
a more general constituency—the American people. I want to be very care
ful here because every American President makes appeal to his "fellow
Americans." But if Reagan continues these appeals, and if he means to change
drastically the direction of American government, and if he is successful in
his programs, this rhetorical strategy portends a move away from traditional
coalition politics to the outskirts of ideological politics. In his speech before
11
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the Conservative Poiitical Action Conference, Reagan said almost as much:
"our victory was not so much a victory of politics as it was a victory of ideas,
not so much a victory for any one man or party as it was a victory for a set
of principles." Such a shift, if successful, would mean a radical change in
both our institutions of government and our political parties. It could por
tend a purge of moderate Republicans and cause conservative Democrats
to change registration. The Democratic Party surely would have to respond.
It might re-align itself as the liberal party, thus insuring a shift to ideological
politics. Or it might move to the right, though not as far as Republicans,
and become a moderate imitation of Republicans. Though imitation is the
sincerest form of flattery, it seldom wins prizes or elections. Were Demo
crats to do so, nonetheless, they would probably find themselves as shadows
of Republicans for the next twenty years.
3.
Finally, ethos: the character and personality of the man, the President. In
the Rhetoric Aristotle said ethos is the most potent means of persuasion,
more potent than logic or emotion. Certainly in these first 3 months of the
administration, Reagan's simple phrasing, easy good humor, consistent po
sitions, and honorable treatment of his adversaries have stood him in good
stead with the American people. But is Reagan's voice authentic to our
times or merely an echo from the days of Calvin Coolidge?
I tend to believe it is an authentic voice of today speaking from the vast
reaches of the Southwest and West. Certainly, it is not one we here in the
East are accustomed to hearing, what with its concern for the 55 mile an
hour speed limit, the need to be born again not only in our private lives,
but our public lives as well. But it is a voice, rambunctious and full-throated,
shouting the age-old cry of Westerners: "Don't Fence Me In!"
In an insightful book, Power Shift: The Rise of the Southern Rim and Its
Challenge to the Eastern Establishment, Kirkpatrick Sale detailed the charac
teristics of this new "establishment" emerging to challenge the old: a "cow
boy era" buttressed by agribusiness, extensive defense contracts, expanding
high technology, expansive real estate, and an aggressive, optimistic style of
living.
Ronald Reagan is no sedate nostalgic throw-back to the days of Ffarding
and Coolidge. Fie is an authentic representative of the rising new establish
ment of the Southwest. The Cowboy era is upon us. And it may be ushered
in more forcibly by that authentic voice—smooth and sincere, honed to
just the right pitch through the many years of practice in movies and tele
vision—than by all the elaborate rhetorical strategies his advisors have de
vised.
Whether it is the prophetic voice of the future, however, will ultimately
rest on the success or failure of economic policies President Ronald Reagan
has proposed.
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RONALD REAGAN'S RHETORIC:
AN UPDATE
Theodore Otto Windt, jr.
During the first year of his administration President Reagan scored a stun
ning series of rhetorical and political successes. He got the first set of budget
cuts in social programs through Congress, even as he increased defense
spending dramatically. Equally, if not more important. President Reagan
signed a bill initiating the largest tax cut in American history, a 25% reduc
tion in federal taxes to be phased in over three years. His success was due
in no small measure to his rhetorical effectiveness. Commentators call him
a "master communicator." And I can personally attest to that.
Last summer (1981), 1 worked as a speech-writer and consultant for a State
Democratic Party Chairman (in a stale other than Pennsylvania) attempting
to frame a response to Reagan's rhetoric and even, on occasion, an alter
native to the Reagan Revolution. Our efforts met only with moderate suc
cess among the party faithful and usually with tepid responses elsewhere.
Generally, audiences seemed to say: "You've had your chance and botched
it. Why not give the President a chance?" My only consolation is that our
predictions that the federal deficit would exceed $90 billion and that un
employment would increase turned out to be accurate, even conservative.
I do hope that our prediction that the prime interest rate will soar to about
25% within the next year will prove to be inaccurate. I fear that may not
be the case.
There is a marked contrast —rhetorically and politically—between the
President's position last May and his position this May. Last year, the Pres
ident was riding the high crest of popularity and support for his programs.
This year, the President's programs have begun to bog down, and the Pres
ident has frequently been on the defensive. From the crest to the trough,
one might say.
I take my purpose this afternoon to speak about the beginning rhetoric
of Mr. Reagan's second year. I intend to give more an over-view than a
detailed examination of a single speech. And we may best understand Rea
gan's rhetoric if we begin to understand the cyclical nature of the Presi
dency.
The Presidency—or at least the modern Presidency—runs in cycles. The
first year of an administration is the "rhetoric phase" of the Presidency.'
Theodore Otto Windt, Jr. is Associate Professor of Rhetoric at the Uni
versity of Pittsburgh. This text is a transcript of a speech delivered at the
73rd annual convention of the Eastern Communication Association, Hart
ford, May 7, 1982.
'See my essay, "Presideniial Rhetoric and Presidential Power; The Reagan initia
tives," Speaker and Cave/, this issue.
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The President has the advantage over Congress and his opponents in this
initial year to place his programs and priorities before the American public.
Mr. Reagan effectively exploited this period of the Presidency last year, as
effectively as any President in modern times.^ Indeed, his effectiveness led
to the passage of budget and tax cuts. Reagan achieved these remarkable
results by presenting reactionary ideas in non-reactionary language.^ In fact,
he was successful in convincing many people that these economic poli
cies—many drawn from the Coolidge administration that Reagan so ad
mires—were not only in the mainstream of American life, but also that they
would lead quickly to the economic recovery he had promised the Amer
ican people during the 1980 Presidential campaign. By quoting approvingly
on occasion from Democrats rather than conservative ideologues, he shied
away from an ideological analysis of our economic problems, thus avoiding
alienating conservative Democrats and moderate Republicans. Furthermore,
he was successful because he made his priorities limited and specific. Above
ail, he side-stepped the potentially divisive social issues of abortion, busing,
and school prayers. It was a tour de force.
The second year of a Presidency is one of policy results and partisan
politics. Attention shifts from promises to performance. Part of this is due
to what James Ceaser and his co-authors have called the "rhetorical Presi
dency."' Because of the rise of the rhetorical component of the Presidency,
candidates have had to promise as much as possible to get elected and then
have to begin producing as soon as possible. Usually, they raise expectations
that cannot be fulfilled. Additionally, the second year problems are com
pounded by the fact that it is an election year. Thus, ideological coalitions
formed to pass policies during the first year may dissolve in the heat of
partisan concerns for re-election. I want to return to this topic, which is the
main thrust of this paper, after completing the cycle.
The second phase ends with the off-term elections in November. In the
twentieth-century the President's party has lost an average of thirty seats in
the House and three Senate seats in these elections. Voters apparently blame
the President's party for his failure to solve problems as rapidly as they
believe they ought to be solved. But more important is the symbolism at
tached to these results. Usually, the elections are seen as a referendum on
the President, his performance and his prospects. If the President's party
loses between fifteen and thirty seats, the results are perceived as incon
clusive. But if his party loses more than thirty—as Democrats did in 1966
under Johnson when they lost forty-nine seats—the President is believed
to be unpopular and vulnerable. Partisan politics—both political and ideo
logical—intensifies, and the President finds himself increasingly on the de
fensive, his other powers weakened. On the other hand, if the party loses
less than fifteen, the President is perceived as a stronger Chief Executive
whose programs have popular support. The most dramatic example of this
^ Ibid.
^ Evans and Novak, two journalistic admirers of Reagan, make the same point al
though they use "radical" rather than "reactionary." Rowland Evans and Robert No
vak, The Reagan Revo/ut/on (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1981), p. 245.
' James W. Ceaser, Glen E. Thurow, Jeffrey Tulis, and Joseph M. Bessette, "The Rise
of the Rhetorical Presidency," Pres/c/enfiaf Studies Quarterly, XI {Spring 1981), 158-71.
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kind of victory occurred in 1962 when the Democratic party did not lose
any net seats in Congress. The public, politicians, and pundits saw this as a
smashing victory for President Kennedy. And it allowed Kennedy to move
away from his very conservative policies of his first two years to advocate a
nuclear test ban treaty and to submit (finally) civil rights legislation to Con
gress.' Thus, the political environment of the third year is greatly dependent
upon the results of the off-term election.
The fourth period, of course, is the election year. At this time much of
legislative politics—except for crises such as the taking of the hostages in
Iran—almost ceases as a President either becomes a lame-duck President or
concentrates on running for re-election. In the latter case, policies tend to
become campaign issues to be placed before the public rather than bills to
be negotiated with Congress.
let me return then to this second year. There have been three distinct
rhetorical efforts by the President during the first four months. First, the
President sought to seize once again the initiative for the second phase of
his economic renewal program; second, he has been on the defensive about
the performance thus far of the budget and tax cuts enacted last year; and
finally, he has engaged in a subtle shift from party politics to ideological
politics. Each of these three is inter-related.
2.
On January 26 President Reagan launched his second assault wave on the
beaches of "big government" and liberal politics. In his State of the Union
address that evening Reagan proposed returning some $47 billion In Federal
programs to state and local governments during the next ten years. He
slated: "In a single stroke we will be accomplishing a realignment that will
end cumbersome administration and spiraling costs at the Federal level while
we ensure these programs will be more responsive to both the people
they're meant to help and the people who pay for them."'' He insisted that
his administration had "faith in State and local governments and the con
stitutional balance envisioned by the Founding Fathers," and that he be
lieved "in the integrity, decency, and sound, good sense of grassroots
Americans."' A second major endeavor, the President announced, was his
attempt to have private agencies take greater responsibility for social pro
grams previously administered by the Federal government:
Our Private Sector Initiatives Task Force is seeking out successful community
models of school, church, business, union, foundation, and civic programs
that help community needs. Such groups are almost invariably far more ef
ficient than government in running social programs.
We're not asking them to replace discarded and often discredited gov
ernment programs dollar for dollar, service tor service. We just want to help
them perform the good works they choose and help others to profit by their
example. Three hundred and eighty-five thousand corporations and private
' Cf. Theodore Windt, "John Fitzgerald Kennedy (1961-1963)," Presidenual Rhetoric:
1961-1980 (Dubuque; Kendall/Hunt, 1980, 2nd ed.), pp. 7-9.
* "State of the Union," Weekly Compilation of Pres/denf/af Documents (February 1,
1982), p. 80.
' Ibid.
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organizations are already working on social programs ranging from drug
rehabilitation to job training, and thousands more Americans have written
us asking how they can help. The volunteer spirit is still alive and well in
America.®
These proposals—long favorites in Reagan's approach to the responsibilities
of the Federal government—elicited little enthusiasm, and certainly nothing
approaching the public support that attended his call for tax and budget
reductions the previous year. One major reason for this apathy lay in the
fact that there was no urgency, no immediate deadline to enact these pro
posals. The transfer of governmental responsibilities would be phased in
over ten years. Obviously, the volunteer programs could only be activated
by voluntary compliance. Furthermore, some governors appeared luke-warm
toward these policies and presented an alternative proposal that they be
lieved would not be as burdensome to them as the President's program.'
These difficulties were compounded as the Presidency moved from the
"rhetoric" stage to the policy period, and events began overtaking the Pres
ident. Despite his predictions of the year before, the economic news was
not good. The prime interest rate dropped from its high of 21% to about
16%, but rates for individual borrowers remain incredibly high. Inflation
dropped dramatically, ending the year at 8.9% and currently running at
about 3% per annum. Some would say the oil glut had a great effect on
this reduction. Others contend that prices are stable because people don't
have enough money to buy things these days. But the two greatest problems
for the President are unemployment and the impending huge Federal def
icit. Unemployment reached 9% in March, and this morning [May 7] au
thorities announced that it reached 9.4% for April. Last year, the President
predicted the Federal deficit would be 42.4 billion dollars. Now with un
employment increasing, it is more probable that it will be beyond 100 billion
dollars. That will be the largest deficit in American history and may even
double the 66 billion deficit of the Ford administration, previously the re
cord high.
Within the uncomfortable economic facts, the President has developed
three rhetorical strategies to deal with them. The first two lines of argument
have been persistently and repetitively used in practically every speech he
has given concerned with the economy. The third has been tried out, but
now apparently has been abandoned as counter-productive.
First, the President has taken credit for reducing inflation and lowering
the interest rate. In his State of the Union address, he stated:
We have an economic program in place, completely different from the ar
tificial quick-fixes of the past. It calls for a reduction of the rate of increase
in government spending, and already that rate has been cut nearly in half.
But reduced spending alone isn't enough. We've just implemented the first
and smallest phase of a three year lax-rate reduction designed to stimulate
the economy and create jobs. Already interest rales are down to per
cent, but they must still go lower. Inflation is down from 12.4 percent to 0.9
percent and for the month of December it was running at an annualized
rate of 5.2 percent. If we had not acted as we did, things would be far worse
'Ibid., pp. 80-81.
' "Governors Map Federalism Plan," PiUsburgh Press, May 3, 1982, p. A-12.
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for all Americans than they are today. Inflation, taxes, and interest rates
would all be higher.'®
But even as the President has taken credit for these positive signs, In his
second line of argument he has sought to shift responsibility elsewhere for
unemployment and the deficit. Sometimes, this line of argument has been
expressed in ideological terms; sometimes, in partisan terms. Again, in the
State of the Union, President Reagan took an ideological line:
First, we must understand what's happening at the moment to the economy.
Our current problems are not the product of the recovery program that's
only just now getting underway, as some would have you believe; they are
the inheritance of decades of tax and tax and spend and spend.
Second, because our economic problems are deeply rooted and will not
respond to quick political fixes, we must stick to our carefully integrated
plan for recovery.
The only alternative being offered to this economic program is a return
to the policies that gave us a trillion dollar debt, runaway inflation, runaway
interest rates and unemployment. The doubters would have us turn back
the clock with tax increases that would offset the personal tax rate reductions
already passed by this Congress."
I call this argument ideological because during the past three decades Re
publicans have controlled the White House sixteen of those years, More
over, some Republicans now are expressing second thoughts about the
validity and rigidity of Reagan's programs. But last Thursday [April 29] Rea
gan placed responsibility for these problems in partisan terms. He directly
accused Democrats of refusing to compromise on the budget and stated
that the break-down of talks between the administration and representa
tives from Congress resulted from basic philosophic differences between
the two political parties. He labelled Democrats as those who would tax and
tax, spend and spend.
The third line of argument Reagan briefly broached was to blame the
media—particularily network news—for some of our economic problems.
In an interview with reporters from the Daily Oklahoman on March 16,
President Reagan accused the media of a "lack of responsibility" and went
on to say:
And you can't turn on the evening news without seeing thai they're going
to interview someone else who's lost his job, or they're outside the factory
that has laid off workers and so forth — the constant downbeat that can con
tribute psychologically to slowing down a new recovery that is in the offing.'^
After his well-publicized remark about "some fellow out in South Succotash
someplace," President Reagan accused the media of doing a "pretty good
job" of presenting a distorted image of him to the public. "I'm a Scrooge
to a lot of people," he complained."
This line of argument is becoming a staple topos for Presidents in trouble.
'""State of the Union," pp. 76-77.
" Ibid., p. 77.
"Remarks in an Interview With Edward Gaylord, Allan Cromley, and lim Standard
of the Daily Oklahoman," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (March 22,
1982), p. 314.
" Ibid., p. 315.
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After the Bay of Pigs disaster, President Kennedy spoke before the National
Association of Newspaper Publishers and called for self-censorship on the
part of the press. On April T, 1968—the day after President Johnson an
nounced he would not seek reelection—he laid many of the problems of
his administration on television and on his inability to communicate effec
tively because of the press.'^ Most of us, I'm certain, recall all too vividly
Nixon's and Agnew's attacks on television news and the press.
What all of this reveals is a President on the defensive, and certainly this
is a major change rhetorically from last year. These problems, moreover,
have been compounded by some unfortunate mis-statements by the Pres
ident and members of his administration. His suggestion that a nuclear war
might be limited to Europe did little to reassure Europeans that he is not a
"trigger-happy" President. Secretary of State Haig's suggestion that a dem
onstration nuclear explosion might be a way to inhibit other powers from
aggression added fuel to the anti-nuclear movement. Such mis-statements
led the President to give his first major speech on nuclear arms on Novem
ber 18,1981 in which he advocated the reduction of strategic nuclear weap
ons (START). But his out-of-hand dismissal of Secretary Breshnev's freeze
on nuclear weapons backfired and thus he was required to open his March
31st press conference with a formal statement about his abhorrence of war
and a reiteration of his START position.
All of this is fairly predictable in this second phase of the Presidency.
Presidents promise too much, and the public expects results too rapidly.
And President Reagan doesn't seem to have learned his lesson on creating
expectations. He has now promised that the economy will turn around and
be on an upswing by the end of the second quarter in June. Democrats
most certainly will hold him to that prediction, and if it does not come true,
they will use it against him in the off-term election which the President has
already described as a referendum on his administration and policies.
3.
But more important politically and rhetorically is Mr. Reagan's move from
procedural politics to ideological politics. During the first year he kept the
controversial social issues on the back-burner as much as possible so as to
focus public attention on his economic recovery program. But in recent
weeks, Reagan has proposed constitutional amendments for a balanced
budget and for allowing prayers in public schools as well as a tax credit for
parents sending children to private schools (some of which practice or preach
segregation of the races). The conservative ideology implicit in his rhetoric
last year is now becoming explicit and marks a new rhetorical development
in the Reagan administration.'®
Let me be precise about what I mean by ideology since it is a word used
loosely. To me, ideology is a distinct and specific form of politics that creates
"See Kennedy, "The President and the Press," in Windt, pp. 14-18.
"See Johnson, "The President and the Media," in Windt, pp. 106-11.
"One of the more absurd examples of this ideological rigidity came from lames
Watt, Secretary of the Interior, who redesigned the seat of the Department so the
buffalo faced right instead of left.
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a different rhetoric from standard deliberative rhetoric. To understand this
distinction one needs to distinguish between procedural politics and ideo
logical politics, for it is in this distinction that the differences in rhetoric
reside.
Politicians committed to procedural politics believe primarily in form and
are deeply concerned about means. No matter how deeply beliefs are held,
these beliefs must be adjusted to the rules and laws—the form—of a dem
ocratic society and to the prevailing public climate. This form then sets the
perimeters of what action and rhetoric are permissible. The doctrinaire
ideologue believes primarily in content—his particular doctrine—and wants
to adjust rules and the public to his doctrine. Edward Shils remarked that:
Ideologies contend more strenously than does the prevailing outlook or the
constituent and overlapping creeds for a purer, fuller, or more ideal reali
zation of particular cognitive and moral values than exists in the society in
which the ideology obtains. Ideologies are more insistent on continuous
contact with sacred symbols and with a fuller manifestation of the sacred in
the existent.^'
Henri Lefebvre aptly summarized the essence of ideological rhetoric in this
way:
Within a group that takes up the ideology, it serves as pretext for zealous-
ness, sense of common purpose, and then the group tends to become a sect.
Adherence to the ideology makes it possible to despise those who do not
adhere to it, and, needless to say, leads to their conversion or condemna
tion.'"
The rhetoric of the ideologue is one of truth explained. The Ideology is
true, not probable. Thus, the veracity of the ideology is not open to argu
ment. In this sense. Ideology stands as the secular counter-part to religion.
Each makes absolute truth claims. Each possesses an authoritative dogma.
And each is essentially moral.
In an angry diatribe, Nicholas von Hoffman pointed to the ideological
content of Reagan's thinking:
We are encouraged to underestimate [Reagan] the more because we think
he's weak on his civics, that he gets his facts wrong. Actually he gets our
facts wrong; he gets his facts right. When he asserts at a press conference
that there were once two separate nations, one North and one South Viet
nam, he's getting our facts wrong, not his. In the social and political circles
he's lived in for the last three decades, there were two nations, one of which
invaded the other. It is a fact.
What we call the errors, mistakes, and inaccuracies that come out of Ron
ald Reagan's mouth are of a pattern conforming to the reactionary view of
the world's geography. That's why, whether it's Vietnam or some inane tale
of $100,000-a-year families getting food stamps, whenever he gels called on
one, it is pulled back, the names are changed, and it is spoken again. For the
ideologue, facts are what you believe are facts. Reagan, like a hard-core
Marxist-Leninist, holds no brief for bourgeois objectivity."
" Edward Shils, The Intellectuals and the Powers & Other Essays (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1972), p. 25.
Henri Lefebvre, The Soc/o/ogy of Marx, trans. Norbert Guterman (New York: Pan
theon Books, 1968), p. 81.
" Nicholas von Hoffman, "Contra Reaganum," Harper's May, 1982, pp. 31-32.
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Despite the hyperbole, von Hoffman hgs a legitimate point In viewing Rea
gan as a reactionary ideologue.
If we understand that Reagan is an ideologue and that the sources for
invention come from the truth of his conservative dogma, then some recent
events become more understandable. When Mr. Reagan is criticized for
getting his facts wrong, he or one of his aides replies that it didn't matter
because the principles were true.
To see this contrast even more vividly, one need only compare one of
President Reagan's recent televised speeches with his speech on February
26th to the Conservative Political Action Conference. In describing his vic
tory in 1980 he said it was a victory "not ... of politics so much as it was a
victory of ideas; not a victory for any one man or party, but a victory for a
set of principles that had been protected and nourished during the years
of grim and heartbreaking defeats by a few dedicated Americans."^" Presi
dent Reagan went on to quote approvingly from Russell Kirk, guru for the
conservative cause. President Coolidge—Reagan's favorite President—and
that late lamented expert on foreign policy, Whittaker Chambers. Of course,
one might expect this kind of speech before such an audience. But I believe
we are going to hear more ideological rhetoric especially on social issues
(the sacred issues of the ideological Right) for two substantial political rea
sons.
First, part of Reagan's Republican constituency is beginning to have sec
ond thoughts about his economic programs and is beginning to distance
itself from him. So too, the "boll weevils" are distressed over the impending
deficits and will go along only reluctantly. Therefore, the President has to
activate that conservative constituency that served as his power base for so
many years and that has been relatively quiet for the past fourteen months.
Second, Democrats are going to make the economic issues the campaign
issues for the off-term elections. Mr. Reagan, I believe, will attempt to raise
the social issues against Democrats so as to activate conservative, one-issue
voters against them and also deflect attention away from the results of his
economic programs.
In making this change to an ideological rhetoric, Mr. Reagan is pursuing
a risky strategy. But then again, Ronald Reagan, as he's already proved, is a
high risk President.
" "Remarks at the Conference Dinner," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu
ments (March 8, 1982), p. 233.
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THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF
INHERENCY IN POLICY
ARGUMENTATION
William L. Benoit
While the concept of inherency has recently played a decreasingly im
portant role in academic debate, it would be a mistake to assume that it has
no contribution to make to policy deliberation. This essay first explicates
the nature of inherency, then discusses two functions this concept can
serve, and finally explores the appropriateness of these functions for several
decision-systems (stock issues, policy making, hypothesis testing, and rules).
This paper limits itself to policy argumentation.
The Nature of Inherency
Inherency arguments can occur in two distinct contexts in deliberation
over the merits of particular policies. They can focus on the question of
whether X causes Y to persist. Here "X" refers to an attribute of the present
system (e.g., a law or court ruling), while "Y" refers to a potential benefit of
the policy under consideration. Inherency arguments can also deliberate
over whether Z can adequately attain Y. Here "Z" refers to an attribute of
the present system (e.g., a law or an agency). These two types of inherency
arguments can be characterized as "casual" and "remedial," respectively.
An example of the former is an inherent barrier which the affirmative claims
prevents the present system from achieving the affirmative plan's benefits;
an example of the latter is a status quo policy which is asserted by the
negative to alleviate that situation. Four criteria exist for determining wheth
er an attribute of the present system is inherent.
Permanence
One criterion for determining whether or not a given characteristic—a
cause or a remedy—is inherent in its substance is permanence, funk and
Wagnalt's New Standard Dictionary states that to "inhere" is "to be a firm
and permanent part, as qualities or adjuncts."' "Inherent" is defined therein
as "permanently belonging to, as an element or quality to its substance."^
Similarly, Webster's Third New International Dictionary asserts that "inherent"
is "permanent existence as an attribute."^ The authoritative Oxford English
Dictionary holds that "inherent" means "existing in something as a perma-
William L. Benoit is Assistant Professor of Speech Communication at Bowl
ing Green State University.
' funk and Wagnalt's New Standard Dictionary (New York: Funk & Wagnall's Co.,
1965), p. 1263.
' Ibid.
»Webster's Third New /nfernaf/ona/ Dictionary (Springfield: 0. & C. Merriam Co.,
1961), p. 1163.
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nent attribute or quality."'' While every dictionary does not actually utilize
the word "permanent" in its definition of inherent, other definitions are
consistent with this conception of inherency.'
This standard of inherency as a permanent attribute of the substance
under consideration has also been accepted in general by the debate com
munity, either implicitly or explicitly. LaCrave's historical survey of discus
sions of inherency discovered that permanence is one of the dimensions of
inherency consistently occurring in treatments of inherency (the other two
are causation and reformability).® One recent debate text articulates this
view of inherency quite explicitly; "We can say that a factor, element, or
quality which exists in something as a permanent and/or inseparable attrib
ute of that something is an inherent factor, element, or quality."' Other
definitions from texts are generally consistent with this notion.®
Thus, one criterion for determining whether a given characteristic is an
inherent attribute of a particular object is if that characteristic is likely to
remain a permanent attribute of that object. Of course, "permanent" in this
context does not mean eternal or ever-lasting, but rather that the charac
teristic is likely to remain an attribute of the object under consideration for
an extended period of time (assuming that the object remains essentially
unchanged).
With this criterion for inherency in mind, let us examine one govern
mental source of inherency, the legislature.® Congress passes public bills
(statutes) which deal with matters of public concern—these are typically
adopted for indefinite periods of time.'" Congress also passes appropriations
bills, which are intended to provide short-term financing for governmental
activities.'^ Many members of the debate community hold statutory law to
be inherent and funding levels (appropriations acts) to be non-inherent.
Thus, if an affirmative could prove that harms exist because the relevant law
Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1973), vol. V, 293.
' For example, Webster's New World Dictionary (Cleveland: William Collins & World
Pub. Co., 1978) and College Ed., defines inherent to be an attribute which is a "natural
and inseparable quality, characteristic, or right" (p. 724). An inseparable quality must,
of course, be a permanent one.
® Charles W. LaCrave, "Inherency: An Historical View," in Advanced Debate ed.
David A. Thomas (Skokie; National Textbook Co., 1975), p. 53.
' C. William Colburn, Sfrafeg/es for £ducaf/ona/ Debate (Boston: Holbrook Press, 1972),
p. 134.
® For instance, George W. Ziegelmueller and Charles A. Dause, Argumentation,' In
quiry and Advocacy (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1975), seem to imply that an
inherent problem is a permanent one: "A totally new policy approach is warranted
only if it can be shown that fay its very nature the present system cannot achieve the
goals" (p. 34—italics original).
'The analysis presented in this paper is of the federal government; however, it
should generally apply to other levels of government as well.
" Joseph P. Harris, Congress and the Legislative Process (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1967), notes that joint resolutions are similar to statutes, except that joint resolutions
"are used for actions of a non-permanent character" (p. 84).
"Stephen K. Bailey, The New Congress (New York: St, Martin's Press, 1966), dis
cusses the recurring appropriations process (pp. 88-90). William J. Keefe and Morris
S. Ogul, The American Legislative Process 4th edition (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,
1977), discusses the trend for substantive committees as well as appropriations com
mittees to review appropriations bills on a yearly basis (p. 161).
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does not prescribe any safety standards for a given occupation, some are
willing to concede that this defect of the present system is an inherent one.
However, If the affirmative links the existence of harms instead to an un
derfunded agency's insufficient enforcement of adequate safety standards,
many of these same members of the debate community would hold that
the problem was not an inherent one; all we need to do is increase the
agency's budget and therefore its enforcement—it is not necessary to resort
to adoption of the resolution to secure the advantages.'-
This may seem odd at first glance, for statutory law and funding levels are
passed by the same policy-making bodies in essentially the same policy-
making process (except that appropriations bills are traditionally introduced
in the House of Representatives^^). So, despite the fact that both bills are
enacted in essentially the same process by exactly the same policy-makers,
one is considered inherent and one non-inherent by some. The criterion
of permanence provides an explanation for this situation. Statutes are (gen
erally) intended to be permanent and thus are inherent; appropriations levels
are intended to be temporary and thus are non-inherent (one exception to
this generalization will be discussed below). This position is justifiable, for
less risk is likely to be entailed by increased funding of an existing program
than in change to an entirely new program, all things being equal,
Inherency in the realm of administrative agencies will be considered next.
Administrative agencies include offices, departments, and agencies of the
Executive branch, as well as the various regulatory agencies. Any inherency
argument which applies either to the enabling legislation or the appropri
ations for these bodies should be treated in the manner outlined in the
section discussing the legislature. However, the rules and decisions pro
mulgated by these administrative agencies must be treated in a different
manner from that.
Acts of administrative agencies are frequently argued to be inherent be
cause they have the force of law. Corpus juris Secundum reports that:
Provided it is a valid duly promulgated or adopted in pursuance of properly
delegated authority, a rule or regulation of a public administrative body or
officer ordinarily has the force or effect of law, and is an integral part of the
statute under which it was made just as though it were prescribed in terms
therein."
However, the claim that administrative agency actions are inherent because
they have equal weight with statutes in the courts oversimplifies the matter,
ignoring the criterion of permanence.
First, it is important to note that administrative agencies can change their
rules at will. Corpus juris Secundum explains:
A public administrative agency ordinarily has the authority to change, alter,
amend, or correct the rules and regulations duly promulgated by it ... it is
discretionary with such as agency whether it will take such action ... It is
" See, e.g., Roy V. Wood, Strategies Debate (Skokie: National Textbook Co., 1968),
p. 28.
" Harris, p. 30.
" "Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure," Corpus juris Secunduma vol. 73
(Brooklyn: American Law Book Co., 1951), § 108 (hereafter referred to as C.J.S.).
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discretionary with a public administrative agency whether it will repeal a rule
or regulation promulgated by it.''
This view Is echoed by American Jurisprudence: "The power to establish
rules and regulations implies the power to modify or repeal, or to create
anew."'' This discretion is quite important, for administrative flexibility is
one of the reasons for the creation of administrative agencies."
Pfiffner and Presthus explain the effect of the discretionary power and
flexibility of administrative agencies, noting that administrative "rules are
easily amended. Compared with statutes, they permit rapid adjustment to
the rapid changes in our complex industrial society."'® Greene and Parthe-
mos reach similar conclusions about the ease of alteration of rules and stat
utes:
[Legislative bodies) are not in continuous session. They are pressed for time
and subjected to an enormous amount of work. The most that can be ex
pected of legislative bodies is that they should lay down an acceptable and
broad policy, depending upon the administrative agencies to carry out Those
policies by detailed adaptation to individual problems as they arise."
Administrative agencies have certain advantages over the judiciary as well
as over the legislature, for, as American Jurisprudence notes, "initiatory func
tions and flexibility are the marks of the administrative process in contrast
to the judicial process.""
Thus, administrative agencies have wide discretionary power to enact,
alter, or repeal their rulings at their own initiative. They are more flexible
than either the legislature or the judiciary. Rules can be easily and rapidly
adjusted to changes in society. They can adapt to specific problems as they
arise. The rulings of administrative agencies, therefore, are likely to be as
permanent as legislative statutes; rather, they are flexible enough to re
spond rapidly to problems as they arise or are discovered.
Furthermore, many administrative agencies also perform quasi-judicial
functions. However, unlike the regular courts, they are not bound by pre
cedent, the doctrine often referred to as stare decisis (to stand by previous
decisions). Corpus Juris Secundum explains that;
The doctrine of stare decisis ... is not generally applicable to the decisions
of adminstrative tribunals; nor does a prior administrative determination or
dinarily preclude a subsequent one on the grounds of equitable estoppel.
Accordingly, administrative bodies are not ordinarily bound by their prior
determinations or the principles or policies on which they are based."
This holding has tended to discourage the courts from even considering
previous administrative decisions for consistency. American Jurisprudence
" C.J.S., § 109.
" "Administrative Law," American Jurisprudence 2nd edition vol. 1 (Rochester: Law
yers Co-operative Pub. Co.. 1962), § 12 (hereafter referred to as Amjur).
" Ibid.
"John M. Pfiffner and Robert Presthus, Public Administration 5th ed. (New York:
Ronald Press, 1967), p. 482.
" Lee Seifert Greene and George Steven Parihemos, American Covernment: Policies
and Functions (New York; Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), p. 57.
" Amjur, § 17.
" C.J.S., § 148.
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points out that "the courts have declined to inquire into the consistency of
conclusions in one case with those reached in similar cases."" This does not
mean that administrative agencies totally ignore previous determinations."
However, the fact that they are not held rigidly to them allows great flexi
bility to deal with new situations, and they are able to alter their decisions
to better deal with changing conditions.
For these reasons, the rules and decisions of administrative agencies can
not be assumed to be permanent, and therefore, cannot be assumed to be
inherent. It seems that the only circumstances under which it could be
safely assumed that a particular administrative rule or decision was perma
nent is if the administrators are attitudinally predisposed in favor of that
particular rule or decision. Therefore, it is in the realm of administrative
agencies that attitudinal inherency is particularly appropriate." It is also use
ful with appropriations acts. Earlier it was noted that one exception to the
generalization that funding levels were not inherent, because they were
temporary, would be discussed later. If Congress is attitudinally predisposed
to keep a funding level at a certain level, that amount of appropriation is
likely to be permanent, and so inherent.
This criterion of permanence can also be applied to the judicial system.
On the federal level we have a three-tiered system. At the bottom are the
District Courts. These are trial courts, and the United States is divided into
90 districts." Above these are the Circuit Courts of Appeals. There are
eleven circuits in the U.S., and each has an appellate court which functions
to "review the decisions of the District Courts located within their Cir
cuits."" The Supreme Court is located at the top of the appellate hierarchy
and reviews decisions of the lower courts." It is generally conceded that
Supreme Court decisions are inherent, but it will be argued here that in
fact Supreme Court decisions are more inherent, or, a better basis for an
inherency argument, than lower court decisions because of the criterion of
permanence.
Supreme Court decisions are likely to last longer than lower court deci
sions, due to its position in the judicial system. Lower courts are bound by
the decisions of higher courts, as Early explains: "Judges below cannot ig
nore with impunity what those on the level next above them have said or
may say, for to depart radically from (or totally ignore) precedent is to invite
appeal and probably reversal."" Thus, lower court decisions can be over
ruled and reversed by higher courts. This can occur if they ignore a pre-
"Amjur, § 470.
" C.j.S., § 148.
" For discussions of attitudinal inherency, see David A. Ling and Robert V. Seitzer,
"The Role of Attitudinal Inherency in Contemporary Debate," lournai of the American
Forensic Association 8 (1971), 278-283; and J. Robert Cox, "Attitudinal Inherency:
Implications for Policy Debate," Southern Speech Communication Journal, 40 (1975),
158-168.
» Stephen T. Early, Constitutional Courts of the U.S. (Totowa: Liitlefield, Adams, and
Co., 1977), p. 19.
" Early, p. 33.
Herbert Jacob, Justice in America 2nd edition (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1972),
p. 196.
"Early, p. 56.
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cedent, or if the lower court rules on an issue which the higher court has
not yet ruled upon, and, on appeal, the higher court disagrees. In this sense
the District Courts' decisions constitute the weakest inherency evidence,
for they can be reversed by their Circuit Court of Appeal and by the Su
preme Court. Circuit Court of Appeals decisions provide stronger inher
ency evidence than District Court decisions, for Circuit Court decisions can
be reversed only on one appeal—to the Supreme Court—instead of on two
appeals. Supreme Court decisions are the best type of evidence for judicial
inherency, for there is no court of appeals above it to reverse it, and so its
decisions are likely to endure."
Scope
The second criterion is scope. This criterion addresses the question of
whether or not the alleged inherent characteristic encompasses the entire
problem area. For example, in the legislative arena. Medicare and Medtcaid
programs do not cover all people in the U.S.; only selected populations are
eligible for assistance in payment of medical care costs (of course, whether
a need exists for coverage beyond that provided by these programs is a
separate question). Or, for an affirmative team to claim a causal inherency,
the "X" which they identify as the cause of their "Y" must encompass the
entire area where "Y" can be found.
This is particularly important in the judicial system, for only one court
covers the entire U.S. as its jurisdiction. District Courts have as their district
the geographical area of one state or less. Their decisions are binding only
in this area. Other District Courts (as well as higher courts) may choose to
adhere to or to disregard one District Court's decision as they please.^®
Similarly, decisions of the Circuit Courts of Appeals are authoritative only
in their own circuit. Other Circuit Courts of Appeals, the Supreme Court,
and even District Courts outside of their circuit are free to adopt or reject
the decisions of a Circuit Court of Appeals.^' Of course. Supreme Court
decisions are binding on all lower courts. Thus, District Courts decisions
have less scope than Circuit Courts of Appeals decisions, which in turn have
less scope than Supreme Court decisions. Thus, two reasons exist for the
superiority of Supreme Court decisions in establishing inherency—perma
nence and scope.
This question of scope is important also for administrative agencies, which
could formulate a rule or decision so as not to encompass the entire scope
of the problem, as the legislature can. Furthermore, it is applicable to re
medial inherency, when the negative would argue that "Z" can deal with
"Two exceptions do exist. First, the Supreme Court can ignore its past decision,
overruling and reversing its own decision. This is a relatively infrequent occurrence—
see, e.g., Loren P. Beth, Politics: The Constitution: and the Sumpreme Court (New York:
Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 49-50. The second exception is even less likely: Congress
can attempt to interfere with Supreme Court decision-making. For an interesting,
indepth discussion, see Raoul Berger, Congress v. the Supreme Court (Cambridge:
Harvard Univ. Press, 1969).
" Early, p. 103; Jacobs, p. 193.
" Early, pp. 106-107; Jacobs, p. 193.
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"Y," the mechanism that they identify as "Z" must cover the entire problem
area under consideration, or the "V."
This criterion is related to claims of significance. In causal inherency, the
affirmative must prove that the causal factor(s) they isolate are responsible
for a significant portion of the problem, or they have no inherent significant
problem. In remedial inherency, the negative must prove that their inherent
mechanismfs) can affect a significant portion of the problem for it to take
on affirmative significance. Thus, to be inherent, a characteristic must not
only be a permanent attribute of the substance under consideration, it must
also encompass a significant part of the problem.
Relevance
A third criterion is relevance. It should be obvious that a statute, or an
administrative ruling or decision could cover the entire population and yet
be irrelevant to the specific affirmative problem. A Supreme Court decision
encompasses the entire U.S., but could well be inapplicable to the specific
problem area.
Efficacy
A fourth criterion is efficacy. Again, it should be obvious that an inherent
mechanism could be permanent, complete in scope, and relevant to the
problem area and yet be dismissed because It exerts no influence on the
problem. In causal inherency, the "X" identified by the affirmative must
actually cause their "Y." In remedial inherency, the "Z" defended by the
negative must be capable of actually dealing with the affirmative's "Y."
Thus far, two conclusions can be drawn about the nature of inherency.
First, four criteria are appropriate for deciding whether a particular char
acteristic is an inherent attribute of the object under consideration: per
manence, scope, relevance, and efficacy. Second, the nature of inherency
appears to be highly field variant, to use Toulmin's terminology. That is,
inherency is best approached in different fashions according to the domain
of the inherency. Appropriation levels are not inherent, along with admin
istrative agency rules and decisions, unless attitudinal inherency can be
demonstrated. This is not necessary for Congressional statutes or for ju
dicial decisions. Decisions of our courts are better evidence for inherency
if they originate in a higher court, because of both the possibility of lower
court reversal by higher courts, and the more limited scope of lower court
decisions.
However, it must be stressed that these are intended to be only a general
set of criteria and suggestions. Other considerations could, in particular
instances, take precedence over these suggestions for inherency. For ex
ample, an affirmative team could argue that a certain administrative agency's
rule or decision was likely to remain inadequate, and therefore, inherent,
not because of attitudinal predispositions against appropriate change, but
because their source of data (upon which they must base decisions) is in-
" Stephen Toulmin, The Usei of Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1958),
pp. 14-15.
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adequate or biased. Nevertheless, these criteria and suggested applications
should prove useful in debate by further clarifying the nature of inherency.
The Functions of Inherency
The concept of inherency as a permanent part of the present system
which is causally related to the affirmative harm can serve two functions in
policy deliberation. First, it can assist the affirmative in proving that benefits
stem from the plan. When the plan removes inherent barriers to achieving
an advantage, then, absent other overlapping barriers, the benefits linked
to those barriers should result.
Although it is occasionally possible to point to pilot studies or experience
in other countries, such evidence is simply not always available. Further
more, even with such evidence, factors could exist in the present system
which were not present in the empirical example which would render that
example inapplicable to the present system. In short, only if the affirmative
can identify and eliminate (or circumvent) the inherent barriers in the pres
ent system can it be assured of plan efficacy. Thus, identification of inherent
barriers is essential to show that the problem can be solved under the af
firmative plan.
A second function inherency can perform is to determine where pre
sumption lies in a counterplan debate. Policies which include inherent
changes are likely to entail more risk than those which alter only temporary
attributes of the present system. Thus, if the counterplan makes no inherent
changes, it is probably less risky and deserves to retain presumption." So,
this conception of inherency facilitates decision-making in close counter-
plan rounds.
Inherency in Decision-Making Systems
The first function identified here—to aid in demonstration of plan effi
cacy—is appropriate to all systems. The need for the affirmative to prove a
benefit created by their plan inheres in stock issues, policy making, hy
potheses testing, and rules alike." There is no reason why elimination of
the cause of the problem or barriers to the advantage cannot satisfy this
requirement in any system.
The second function is not universal. Most systems are ambiguous on the
question of presumption in a counterplan. Does the negative retain it be
cause they are negative, or do they lose it because they abandon the status
quo? In hypotheses testing, presumption is always against the resolution, so
the second function is not appropriate for this decision-making system."
" For those who distinguish between minor repairs and counterplans, the former
consists of non-inherent changes and retains presumption. The latter includes in
herent changes and presumption should be determined on the basis of degree of
risk or psychological presumption. See., e.g., Vincent F. Follert and William L. Benoit,
"Argument About Argument," SCA Convention, Anaheim, November, 1981.
"For a discussion of the first three systems, see Robert Rowland, "Debate Para
digms: A Critical Evaluation," SCA-AFA Summer Argument Conference, Alto, UT,
August 1981. For the rules perspective, see Follert and Benoit.
" See David Zarefsky, "A Reformulation of the Concept of Presumption," CSSAC,
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The decision rule for a counterplan In the rules perspective is risk (then
psychological presumption), so it manifestly is appropriate there.'® The am
biguity in stock issues and policy making decision systems can be remedied
by incorporating the criterion suggested here.
Summary
Thus, two functions which inherency can perform are: to demonstrate
plan efficacy and to distinguish between counterplans. The first is useful in
meeting another affirmative burden, the second in deciding whether the
negative retains presumption in a counterplan round. The first function is
appropriate for all decision-making systems. The second is appropriate for
the rules perspective, not appropriate for hypothesis testing, and could
easily be Incorporated in stock issues and policy making.
Chicago, April, 1972; Zarefsky, "Argument as Hypothesis Testing," SCA, San Francis
co, December, 1976.
Follert and Benoit.
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CARTER'S FIRST FIRESIDE CHAT
Dan F. Hahn
Except for his Inaugural Address, a ceremonial speech not expected to
be heavily weighted with substance, this was Carter's first speech to the
nation as President. Thus, it was his first chance to lay out his program to
the people and, through them, to put pressure on Congress.
But he chose not to do that. Rather, the speech was more of a campaign
address than a Presidential call to action. That decision may have been the
beginning of the end for his presidency. Certainly there were precedents
for another approach, for pushing harder. In 1933 F.D.R. utilized the "first
100 days" to push through his recovery program, and Lyndon Johnson relied
on the sympathy evoked by the assassination of John Kennedy to establish
the major outlines of his Great Society programs.
But President Carter did not try to capitalize on the so-called "honey
moon" period. Rather, he chose to downplay his program to build his fol
lowing. The goal, apparently, was to consolidate his constituency, "to store
up goodwill and high ratings to be expended against the Congress and other
possible centers of resistance"^ at a later point.
Given that goal, the speech was relatively effective. "His syntax matched
the simplicity of his sweater. He came across as friendly and solici
tous . . .
The fireplace not only evoked F.D.R. but suggested the White House might
be short on natural gas, like a lot of other American homes. With Amy in
public school, the White House staff hailing taxis, and the promise of Gov
ernment regulations written in 'plain English,' Mr. Carter [showed] how well
he [understood] public discontent at the distance and insensitivity of gov
ernment.'
Beyond the generalized appeal to "the people," the language of the speech
provided tokens of identification for large and significant groups. Phrases
such as "sacrifice," "dedication," "simplicity," "share," and "shared faith"
reminded his religious audience of his ties with them. Words like "com
petency," "responsibility," "hard work," "mutual effort," and "efficiency"
were aimed at the business community. And patriots could revel in phrases
like "trust one another," "united nation," "common good" and "cooper
ation." These, it will be noted, were also aspects of Carter's personality and
background that he stressed during the campaign—his religious faith, agri
business experience and deep-felt patriotism.
There is a sense in which it is fair to say that Carter was still not speaking
as President, i.e., as a politician, but as an outsider. This was even true of
Dan F. Hahn is Associate Professor of Communication Arts and Sciences
at Queens College.
' "Chat by the Fire," New York Times, Feb. 4, 1977, p. A22.
' Ibid.
' Tom Wicker, "Symbols and Reality," New Vork Times, Feb. 4, 1977, p. A23.
* Wicker.
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the non-verbal appeals—the sweater of the average person replaced the
three-piece suit. And his controlled smile reminded us that our resentment
should be aimed at the oil companies, at the bureaucrats, at the government
itself, but not at Jimmy Carter.
So there were components in the speech which made it a good campaign
exercise. But was that the right speech to give at that point? Realities were
already pressing the Carter Administration. His nominee for Director of the
C.I.A., Theodore Sorensen, had been rejected* and his nomination of Paul
Warnke as director of the State Department's Disarmament Agency was in
trouble.^ Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns had come out against the
Carter economic plan.® Clearly, the unity he desired was not available. He
opted, therefore, for a statement of objective rather than a push for policy.
But the unity he sought to thereby build was doomed. Governmental de
cisions, with the possible exception of crisis decisions, are always divisive
because each decision inevitably tramples on somebody's interests. Further,
it may be that Carter wanted a perfect opportunity to unveil his energy
program. The hard winter was demonstrating the need, but by April 20th,
his target dale for introducing the program, it was predictable that Congres
sional resolve would have melted with the winter snow.
I conclude that Carter, caught in the conflict between campaigning and
governing, symbols and reality, opted for the wrong course.
But that was not the only contradiction in the speech. In fact, the re
mainder of this analysis will be devoted to uncovering those additional con
flicts.
People^ vs. People^
Carter ran for the presidency on a platform of making the government as
good as the people. Christopher Johnstone has contended that "Carter's
persuasive strategy seemed calculated to create a circumstance in which
voters could reaffirm their faith in their country and in ihemse/ves by voting
for him."'
As President he seemed to continue to hold to that belief and that strat
egy, to think that a presidential suggestion that we all turn down our ther
mostats was going to be followed. The truth is that there was hardly anything
in our response to the energy crisis that confirmed Carter's romantic view
of us. He was engaging in good politics but his historic knowledge of how
we respond to the call for sacrifice was highly inaccurate. James Reston
noted, "The hard truth is that we are the most recklessly wasteful people
in the world; that, by his own estimate, we are actually wasting more fuel
than we import from other countries. Our record since the oil embargo of
1973 is neither good nor generous, but is a national disgrace."®
In short, the Carter assessment of the people was wide of the mark, And
so were his appeals, which were moderately emotional generalizations rath-
' Wicker.
* James Reston, "An Uncertain Trumpet," New York Times, Feb. 4, 1977, p. A23.
'Christopher Lyie Johnstone, "Electing Ourselves in 1976: jimmy Carter and the
American Faith," Western Journal of Speech Communication, 42 (1978) 242.
' Reston.
31
et al.: Complete Issue 19(3-4)
Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato, 1982
66 SPEAKER AND GAVEL
er than concrete solutions. While the President was asking us to transcend
to a higher level of self-sacrifice via "voluntary participation," most of us
responded by shivering and agreeing that it was too cold at that height.
And while the drama between the rhetorical citizen and the real citizen
was being played out, there were even some indications that Carter didn't
esteem us quite as highly as he claimed. Several times in the speech he
suggested that government policy had to be made comprehensible to the
people. It is at least arguable that Carter saw the government as an intelligent
body which had to reduce its' intellectual language and style to suit the
needs of simple folk who need special help to comprehend government
regulations. While at one level it seems pleasant to hear that the government
is going to spend more time and effort making things easier for you, there
is also a nagging suspicion that anyone who calls for such alterations may
be looking down at you.
And, again, the non-verbal persuasion could reinforce that viewpoint.
Here was Carter portraying himself as an ordinary citizen, playing President
of the United States costumed in a cardigan sweater.
The contradictions became obtrusive. Who were we—the real us, the us
he claimed or the us he implied? And who was he? A dressed up citizen
or a dressed-down President?
To Sacrifice or Not
There were five references to sacrifice in the speech:
1. "Some of these efforts will also require dedication—perhaps even some
sacrifice—from you."'
2. "if we all cooperate and make moderate sacrifices" we can make "our
own lives more enjoyable and productive."
3. "in order to solve our energy problems we need not sacrifice the
quality of our lives."
4. The economic program "does not ask one group of people to sacrifice
solely for the benefit of another group."
5. "We have lost faith in joint efforts and mutual sacrifices."
Just listing the references together is enough to point up the contradic
tions. First he said that perhaps sacrifice would be necessary, then that it
would be moderate, then that it wouldn't affect the quality of our lives, that
it wouldn't fall unevenly upon any one group and, finally, that we have lost
faith in sacrificing at all.
By the end there is no way an audience could know what was meant. No
one knows how a sacrifice could help but affect the quality of life; no one
knows how a sacrifice can be "moderate" and still be so widespread as to
be evenly distributed throughout the population. No one knows the goals
for which we were to sacrifice, the nature of the sacrifices to be proposed,
or the hoped-for effects of the sacrificing. All we know is that Carter had
sacrifice on his mind.
'"The Text of Jimmy Carter's First Presidential Report to the American People,"
New York Times, Feb. 3, 1977, p. 22. All other references from the speech are from
this source.
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An Open and Closed Case
In both the campaign and this speech. Carter called for an open govern
ment. But his unwillingness to spell out the causes and effects of sacrifice
was one indication that the openness was not to be complete. And there
were others,
The idea of "open government" is that problems and their proposed
solutions are openly debated and the final decision is made on the basis of
the public argumentation. Yet in this speech Carter gave us a taste of his
less-than-open approach. For one thing, he made it clear that the public
debate approach was not the one to be followed when he said, "1 will report
to you from time to time about our government, both our problems and
our achievements ...." Debate participants do not need periodic reports
on problems and progress.
But perhaps it was in his style where the most telling evidence of his lack
of openness was apparent. More specifically, the "proof" he set forth in
this speech was more stylistic than openly argumentative. For instance, he
tried to prove the existence of an energy problem through his adverbs. The
"extremely" cold weather during the winter, he said, had "dangerously
depleted" our supplies. No statistics on reserves were given, no arguments
made on the basis of present and projected supplies. There was nothing for
the audience to debate; we were left to accept or reject his analysis.
Likewise, he characterized his economic plan as "balanced." What was
balanced against what we were not told. Oh, we were informed that it "does
not ignore inflation to solve unemployment—or vice versa." But which
portions of the plan were to address which problems and why those solu
tions were favored over others were materials for public debate which were
omitted from the speech. Again, our role clearly was reduced to two alter
natives—accept or reject.
To make those choices easier, a high level of antithesis ran through the
speech: real v. artificial shortages, work v. welfare, essentials v. luxuries,
strength v. weakness, high v. low, productivity v. stagnation, confused and
wasteful v. competent and efficient. By limiting our information and struc
turing our choices into clearly dichotomous good v. evil options. Carter
hoped to gain our acquiesence without the participation that a truly open
government would require.
Another indication of the same orientation can be found in Carter's em
ployment of pronouns. Personal references (I, me, my and the "Royal we")
were used 127 times while plurals (we, our, us, "the citizens," etc.) were
employed only 71 times. In the all-important mood-setting first few para
graphs, eighteen of the first 155 words were personal references while only
seven were plural references. Further, the roles identified by the pronouns
were quite different. For Carter it was "I can," "I will," "I made," "I intend,"
"I want," and "I plan." the "you" roles were primarily information receiving:
"to bring to you," "to let you know," "want you to know," "as you probably
know," "report to you," and "to tell you." Thus, the format was clear; I will
make the decisions and then I will let you know. True, this is a kind of
openness, but it is not what is meant by an "open government." It is not
the Wilsonian "open covenants openly arrived at," but rather "open deci-
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sions arrived at behind closed doors." The resultant openness, of course, is
a facade because no one ever knows if the announced decision and that
arrived at in secrecy are identical—or even vaguely similar. Additionally,
when there is no linkage between decision-making and policy justification,
the justifications tend to be framed in terms of the values of the audience
regardless of the reasons for the decisions.
It's An Emergency, Go Slow
The final contradiction which permeates the speech was between his
descriptions of problems and his prognoses for solutions. The problems
were introduced as emergencies but the solutions were hardly described
as panaceas:
problem—"One of our most urgent projects is to develop a national
energy policy."
solution—it "started before this winter and will take much longer to solve."
problem—"the worst economic slowdown of the last forty years."
solution—"It will produce steady, balanced, sustainable growth."
problem—"we must reform and reorganize the Federal Government."
solution—the system "will take a long time to change."
problem—the tax system is "a disgrace."
solution—"The economic program ... will ... be just a first step."
problem—"The welfare system also needs a complete overhaul."
solution—We have "begun a review."
Finally, speaking generally about all of his proposals, he said "Many of them
will take longer than 1 would like ...." How one reacts to all of these
identifications of emergencies followed by slow and partial solutions de
pends somewhat on political orientation. A sympathizer might say that Car
ter was just being realistic about how long solutions take, while an opponent
might contend that Carter was trying to demonstrate a commitment to
promises on which he had no intention, or chance, of delivering.
A more rhetorical assessment would take as its point of departure Murray
Edelman's claim that every government engages in a "cycle of anxiety and
reassurance" to provide a "supportive following.""' We are all familiar with
the process in this country: first we are told that somebody (usually Russia)
is a great danger; then we are assured that our government can cope with
the situation. In this speech, then. Carter's problem was that he oversold
the anxiety part of the formula by elevating problems into emergencies.
Naturally, then, the world of political reality being as slow as it is, he could
not promise to solve the emergencies immediately.
Assuming that he continued this rhetorical approach throughout his pres
idency, it may give us a clue to his declining fortunes. That is, any leader
who oversells problems without overselling his solutions is bound to be
perceived as incapable of coping with the problems.
Murray Edelman, "On Policies that Fail," The Progressive, May 1975, p. 22.
34
Speaker & Gavel, Vol. 19, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 1
https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol19/iss3/1
SPEAKER AND GAVEL 69
At any rate, in this speech Carter effectively built anxiety about problems
but was unable to complete the cycle by giving assurance that he could
solve them.
Conclusion
I conclude that Carter's First Fireside Chat was rift with contradictions.
Rather than lay out a program he chose to try to build his following and
this "symbols v. reality" approach weakened his appeal as an energetic lead
er. Other contradictions, between his assessment of his countrymen and
the reality, between whether to call for sacrifice or promise no lowering in
the quality of our lives, between his call for an open govement and his
evident continuation of a closed decision-making system and between his
posing problems as emergencies while failing to reassure us with his solu
tions, all conspired to make him look weak—perhaps weaker than he was,
certainly weaker than he needed to appear.
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RONALD REAGAN'S 1980 CAMPAIGN
COMMUNICATION: A CASE STUDY IN
POLITICAL MYTHOGRAPHY
Dirk C. Gibson
American presidential elections have been extensively studied by scholars
in academic disciplines such as political science, sociology, journalism and
speech communication. This diversity of professional orientation has re
sulted in a wide variety of theories purporting to explain public commu
nication during electoral campaigns. Political rhetoric, for example, has been
explained as offering uses and gratifications, setting the public agenda, pro
viding the opportunity for transactions between candidates and voters, and
diffusing information.'
Although these studies are valuable, alternate approaches to political
rhetoric are needed. Edelman noted:
to explain political behavior as a response to fairly stable individual wants,
reasoning, attitudes and empirically based perceptions is therefore simplistic
and misleading. Adequate explanation must focus on the complex element
that intervenes between the environment and the behavior of human beings:
creation and change in common meanings through symbolic apprehension
in groups of people, of interests, pressures, threats and possibilities.'
In addition, Cassirer has observed that empirical and practical analyses con
tain philosophic assumptions, and may have mythic aspects.' McDonald
agreed, observing that "a satisfying explanation or elucidation requires more
than data and once we are beyond data we find ourselves leaning on the
metaphors and myths that stand between us and the unknown."'
This case study of President Ronald Reagan's campaign rhetoric in the
1980 general election will report his use of political myth. The data base for
this research is Associated Press coverage of Reagan's public communication
during the campaign. Two archetypal, traditional mythoi will be identified,
the conspiratorial enemy and the hero/savior myths, and other case studies
in political myth will be noted.
Dirk C. Gibson is a doctoral candidate at Indiana University, but devel
oped this study while a graduate student at the University of Arizona.
' For a complete discussion of major theories of political communication, see Sid
ney Kraus and Dennis Davis, The fffecfs of Mass Communication on Political Behavior
(University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1976); and Judith S. Trent, "A Syn
thesis of Methodologies Used in Studying Political Communication," Central States
Speech Journal 26 (1975), 287-97.
' Murray Edelman, Politics As Symbolic Action (Chicago: Markham Publishing Com
pany, 1971), p. 2.
' "Theoretical, practical and aesthetic consciousness, the world of language and of
morality, the basic forms of the community and the state—they are all originally tied
up with mythico-religious conceptions," Ernst Cassirer, Language and Myth (Toronto:
Dover Publications, 1946), p. 44.
' Lee. C. McDonald, "Myths, Politics and Political Science," Western Political Quar-
terly 22(1969), 147.
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Myth and Politics
The study of political myth is not a recent phenomenon. Although many
different perspectives on political myth have been advanced, there appear
to be some common elements.^ Thus, in this essay, political myth is under
stood to refer to rhetorical structures or models which shape political per
ceptions.
Roelofs noted in 1967 that "the Americans have erected around the op
erative aspects of their political system a series of myths . . . therefore, just
as they periodically break into violence, so also do they even more contin
ually escape into the comforts of myth."' The creation of pseudo events
through political rhetoric, first described by Boorstin in 1961, allows us to
"create events where there are none, to make hereos where none exist
... to fabricate national purposes when we lack them."^
Why do Americans engage in political mythicization? McGee suggested
that "political myths are purely rhetorical phenomena, ontological appeals
constructed from artistic proofs and intended to redefine an uncomfortable
and oppressive reality."® Bennett also considered myth a significant part of
American politics:
This body of myth is the basis of political consciousness in American society.
... Myths condition the public to the powerful symbols used by politicians.
Myths underwrite the status quo in times of stability and they chart the
course in times of stress. In the day-to-day business of politics, myths set the
terms for most public policy debate. When mythical themes and myth-re
lated language are stripped away from policy discourse, very little of sub
stance remains. Most political controversy centers around disagreement over
which myth to apply to a particular problem.®
® Definitions of myth vary considerably, Edelman, p. 14, saw myth as "an unques
tioned belief held in common by a large number of people that gives events and
actions a particular meaning." W. Lance Bennett, "Myth, Ritual and Political Control,"
Journal of Communication 30 (1980), 196, defined myth as "associative mechanisms
that link private experience, ongoing reality and public history into powerful frame
works of understanding." Martha Solomon, "The 'Positive Woman's Journey: A Myth
ic Analysis of the Rhetoric of STOP ERA," Quarterly Journal of Speech 65 (1974), 263,
noted that myth is "a complex of psychic and cultural associations of enormous non-
rational persuasiveness." Nell Postman, Language and Reality, (New York; Holt, Rine-
hart and Winston, 1967), p. 291, staled that myth is "the collective perspective of a
culture towards its environment." Hugh Dalziel Duncan, Commun/cafion and Social
Order (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 50, asserted that myth is "a retro
spective pattern of moral values, sociological order and magical belief." With respect
specifically to political myth, Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham D. Kaplan, Power and
Society, (New Haven: Vale University Press, 1950), p. 117, defined political myth as
"those political perspectives most firmly adopted ... the fundamental assumptions
about political affairs." Jeff D. Bass and Richard Cherwitz, "Imperialism, Mission and
Manifest Destiny: A Cast Study of Political Myth in Rhetorical Discourse," Southern
Speech Communication Journal, 43 (1978), 217, noted that "political myth selectively
interprets and constructs a social reality, influencing the perceptions of events and
relationships."
* Mark H. Roelofs, The Language of Modern Pofit/cs (Homewood, IL: The Dorsey
Press, 1967), p. 259.
' Daniel ]. Boorstein, The Image (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), p. 5.
• Michael C. McGee, "In Search of the People: A Rhetorical Alternative," Quarterly
Journal of Speech 61 (1975), 247-9.
' Bennett, p. 168.
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Four recent case studies of political myth are noteworthy. Hahn and Con-
char's research into the issues vs. images dichotomy, Bormann's 1977 dis
cussion of Lincoln's efforts at national unification after the Civil War, Solo
mon's 1974 study of the STOP ERA movement and Bass and Cherwitz's
analysis of anti-imperialist movements in the United States and Great Britain
all investigated some aspect of political myths. Bormann, Solomon, and
Bass and Cherwitz found political myths to be highly effective rhetorical
strategies in a diverse set of situations. However, none of these studies
investigated political myth in the public communication behavior of can
didates. Edelman concluded that "we choose our significant political sym
bols and stances in a world of metaphorical and mythic cues.""
Reagan's Political Myths
What follows will document Reagan's use of two political myths: conspir
atorial enemy and hero/savior. These are two basic myths, as Edelman not
ed, "in place of a complicated empirical world, men hold to a relatively
few, simple archetypal myths of which the conspiratorial enemy and the
omnicompetent hero-savior are the central ones.""
The conspiratorial enemy assailed by Reagan during the 1980 presidential
campaign was "Unnecessary Government Regulation." One of the central
Republican campaign points was that government has grown too large, in
part through governmental regulations. Reagan told a senior citizen's rally
in Philadelphia on September 8 that governmental regulations were their
nemesis and promised that "I will not tolerate, and will fight with all my
strength, the inexcusable waste, fraud and abuse of government programs,
many of which are aimed at older Americans."" Two days later, Reagan
claimed that $195 billion could be saved over a five-year period, by the
elimination of waste and "outright fraud."" The next day, Reagan argued
that Carter policies had discouraged domestic energy production."
"Since 1977, his administration has ignored the problems overly strict
compliance schedules (with environmental regulation) have caused the steel
industry," Reagan claimed in Green Bay, Wisconsin on October 3." Reagan
championed women's rights in Claremont, California, on October 14, where
he argued that "there are hundreds of federal regulations that discriminate
against women. I have been told that in those regulations at the Federal
level, there are literally hundreds of instances of discrimination against
women—I would eliminate those as quickly as I could.
On October 19, in coal country at Pawnee, Illinois, Reagan complained
that the government response to our energy shortages was "they follow up
Ernest W. Bormann, "Fetching Good Out of Evil; A Rhetorical Use of Calamity,"
Quarterly Jourr^al of Speech 63 (1977), 130-1, Dan F. Hahn and Ruth M. Gonchor,
"Political Myth; The Image and the Issue," Commun/caf/on Quarterly 20 (1972), 57-
65.
" Edelman, p. 83.
" Edelman, p. 83. Also, see Solomon, pp. 262-3; McDonald, p. 144; and Bormann,
pp. 130-1.
" Arizona Daily Star, Sept. 8, 1980, p. A-14.
'* Arizona Daily Star, Sept. 10, 1980, p. A-1.
" Arizona Daily Star, Sept. 11, 1980, p. A-1.
Arizona Daily Star, Oct. 3, 1980, p. A-2.
" Arizona Daily Star, Oct. 14, 1980, p. A-3.
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with regulations" which further inhibit supply increases.'' Less than a week
later, Reagan proposed "cuts in government spending and waste, simplified
depreciation schedules for business and industry, a reduction in govern
ment red tape, and decontrol of the energy industries."'' These examples
illustrate Reagan's use of a conspiracy myth. Big government has simply
become obese, and a horde of bureaucrats are blamed for mismanagement
and waste on a scale eclipsing that of the infamous Gang of Four in Peking.
A second mythic appeal was used, characterizing Reagan as a hero/savior.
This myth asserted that the failings of the Carter administration would be
alleviated by the competence of a Reagan administration. This myth was
fostered by indicting Carter's record on public policy issues, coupled with
portrayal of Reagan as defender of the people. The need for salvation by a
hero/savior was demonstrated through delineation of Carter's shortcom
ings, followed by assurances of Reagan's potential political prowess.
Carter was assailed on many fronts, in general terms and on specific issues.
A favorite Reagan charge concerned "the litany of broken promises and
despair" represented by Carter policies." The economy was often used by
Reagan to indict Carter for "an American tragedy, an assault on the hopes
and dreams of millions of American families."^' In Buffalo, New York, on
September 12, Reagan said that the city port "is an empty, idle place be
cause of Carter's failures.""
Reagan hammered at Carter's 'Misery Index' to show the problems of the
status quo. In Miami, Reagan noted that "today, after three and a half years
of Carter failures, that Misery Index has grown to 20.3%"; six days later in
Los Angeles, Reagan blamed New York City's financial problems on "un
settled market conditions and continuing high inflation resulting from mis-
managment of the economy by the Carter administration."" "The Carter
administration's handling of the economy has been a disaster," Reagan as
serted on October 24 in Greensville, South Carolina; the following day, in
Washington, D.C., he said "that's not just a record of economic failure, but
failure on a scale so vast, its dimensions so broad, with effects so devastating,
that it is virtually without parallel in American history,""
Reagan played the hero's role by contrasting Carter's economic failures
with reassurances about the efficacy of his policies, which he documented
by stating that "economists who have studied the program have given us
their word."" "I will restore the integrity of the Social Security system, and
see to it that inflation does not rob you of your income from Social Secu
rity," Reagan stated on October 24."
Reagan defended his leadership abilities, claiming in visionary language
that "the 1980's can be a decade of deliverance for Americans, deliverance
" Arizona Daily Star, Oct. 19, 1980, p. A-1.
" Arizona Daily Star, Oct. 25, 1980. p. A-3.
"Arizona Daily Star, Sept. 12, 1980, p. A-2; Sept. 8, 1980, p. A-14; Sept. 21, 1980,
p. B-10; and Oct. 23, 1980, p. A-5.
'^Arizona Daily Star, Sept. 10, 1980, p. A-3.
"Arizona Daily Star, Sept. 12, 1980, p. A-2.
" Arizona Daily Star. Sept. 23, 1980, p. A-3; and Sept. 29, 1980, p. A-7.
" Arizona Daily Star. Oct. 24, 1980, p. A-3; and Oct. 25, 1980. p. A-22.
" Arizona Daily Star. Oct. 25, 1980, p. A-2.
" Arizona Daily Star, Oct. 14, 1980, p. A-3.
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from high taxes, government excesses and military weakness."" Reagan
demonstrated his mythical heroic qualities by publicizing Carter's weak
nesses and claiming that he would save the day through more effective
leadership. In addition to the economy, Reagan blamed Carter for the hos
tages' captivity, the Iran/Iraq war, and the disclosure of the existence of the
Stealth bomber.*®
In conclusion, this essay has taken a first step in exploring electoral uses
of political myth. As Craber has observed, there is value in conducting case
studies of American public communication to discern norms of political
rhetoric, in hopes of establishing standards of conduct and evaluation.^'
Judging by Reagan's comfortable margin of victory over his incumbent ad
versary, there is considerable merit in closer study of political myth in public
communication.
"Arizona Daily Star, Oct. 14, 1980, p. A-3.
"Arizona Daily Star. Sept. 5, 1980, p. A-1; Sept. 10, 1980, p. A-2; Oct. 19, 1980, p.
A-2; and Oct. 22, 1980, p. A-1,
" Doris Graber, Verbal Behavior in Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1976),
p. 330.
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Is It the Congress/ona/ Record
Or the Congressional Second-Thoughts!
Senator Robert C. Byrd (West Virginia, Minority Leader):
"The Congress/ona/ Record is a vital instrument of the legislative process
without which our work would be nearly impossible. We rely on the Record
to follow the progress of legislation, from a bill's introduction to its passage
or defeat. When we are busy with committee meetings or other Senate
business, we depend on the Record for a complete account of the floor
discussion we might have missed. And when we have completed our work,
the Record preserves the legislative histories to which the courts, long into
the future, will refer in determining the Congressional intent behind the
laws which we have written. The Congress/ona/ Record is a symbol of our
democracy through which the people may fully observe the making of their
laws and may hold their lawmakers accountable for their words and deeds."
(Quote, Nov. 15, 1981, 511.)
Is It the Congressional Record
Or the Congress/ona/ Second-Thoughts!
Senator Barry Goldwater (Arizona, Republican);
"Although I have known, or at least thought I knew, that the Congress/ona/
Record could be checked by the Senators or their assistants for the purpose
of correcting grammatical errors, punctuations and so forth, I never dreamed
of the extreme to which this has gone and the way the Record is being
abused. I learned, to my utter surprise and my complete disgust, that Sen
ators are not only allowed to correct grammatical errors, and correct other
such mistakes made during debate, but I was told that entire pages and,
indeed, entire speeches were crossed out of the Record before the Record
was completed and handed out the next morning. Now this is going too
far. I was so shocked by this that I began to realize that the only way we are
going to keep a permanent, accurate, dependable record of every word
that is said on the floor of the Senate is if we allow television to record the
actions of the Senate. Never before have I backed or supported a move to
televise the Senate, but, I feel that in view of the abuses of the Congress/ona/
Record, and in the interests of keeping the American people accurately
informed as to what we said and what we debated and decided, I must
remove myself from the list of opponents to television. I will support the
television move when it comes back to the floor." (Congress/ona/ Record,
May 21, in New York Times, May 25, 1982, Y-18).
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Is It the Congressional Record
Or the Congressional Second-Thoughts^
Francis X. Clines and Bernard Weinraub {New York Times reporters):
"Senator Arlen Specter was sitting in his office on Monday afternoon, lis
tening to his 'squawk box' and the floor debate on the school prayer issue.
Suddenly Mr. Specter, a Republican from Pennsylvania, heard Senator Ernest
F. Hollings, Democrat of South Carolina, provoke an uproar by referring to
Senator Howard M. Metzenbaum, who is Jewish, as 'the Senator from B'nai
B'rith.'
"Mr. Hollings's remark came while he was arguing the case for a bill on
voluntary prayer in public school, and Senator Metzenbaum and others
were clamoring for recognition.
"As Senator Specter, who is Jewish, rushed out of his office to the Senate
floor, Mr. Metzenbaum voiced his 'sadness and embarrassment' at the Holl
ings comment. Mr. Hollings responded with an apology, remarking, 'I said
it in a moment of levity. I said it only in fun.'
"Reaching the floor. Senator Specter heatedly denounced Senator Holl
ings, calling his comments 'inappropriate and offensive.'
"Several hours later. Senator Specter received a phone call from the
majority leader, Howard H. Baker Jr. Mr. Baker said the Hollings remarks
were 'unfortunate' and 'not meant in the context that they came out,'
according to an aide to Senator Baker. Accordingly, Mr. Baker asked Mr.
Specter if he would agree, as Senator Metzenbaum had agreed, to have the
entire contretemps deleted in the next day's Congress/ona/ Record, an unusual
step.
"Senator Specter reluctantly concurred in removing the remarks, but only
if the Congress/ona/ Record on Tuesday carried a note saying that an exchange
had been deleted. Senator Baker agreed.
"The next day's Congress/ona/ Record carried, then, the following innoc
uous note:
"'Mr. Baker. Mr. President, earlier today there was a colloquy between
the Senator from South Carolina and the Senator from Ohio, entered into
a little later by the Senator from Pennsylvania.
"'After consultation with the parties involved, it appears that there is a
desire to have that colloquy deleted from the official record.'" {New York
Times, Nov. 19, 1981, Y-14.)
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